WHY RETENTION POLICIES DO NOT TRAVEL: THE CONDITIONS BEHIND TENURE SYSTEMS AND INCENTIVE CONTRACTS FOR ACADEMIC STAFF
Article Information
Abstract
Policymakers who seek to reduce academic staff turnover often
borrow measures from other higher education systems. This paper argues that
tenure guarantees, incentive contracts, decasualisation targets, workload norms and
transparent career paths do not act on turnover directly. Each works through an
intermediate state, such as embeddedness, exhaustion, perceived fairness or
uncertainty, and only under a specific condition. Evidence from the United States,
China, South Korea, Australia, Russia and Belarus is compared with administrative
data for Uzbekistan. A measure transferred without its condition does not remove
turnover but moves it to the part of the workforce that official reports do not show.
A selection rule is proposed in which the degree of employment formalisation in an
institution is assessed before any retention measure is chosen.

